

Finland 19 August 2025

Call for contributions: Member States

Member States are invited to respond to the guiding questions below relating to the review on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations. Several questions are addressed specifically to current and former Host Countries and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries to United Nations peace operations.

Questions for all Member States

1. What are the main challenges confronting peace operations today and what challenges are expected to be faced by peace operations in the future?

While the need for peace operations remains, and may even grow, increasing **geopolitical tensions, animosity towards UN presence and fragmentation** continue to undermine effective collective action. It is unlikely the situation will change in the foreseeable future. However, peace operations are an important tool to promote and maintain peace and security and to stabilize their areas of operations. They should be established, and they should deliver where they are needed, despite the realities of non-permissive geopolitical era and disconnected political support.

The establishment and success of peace operations depends on the **decision-making capacity of the UN**, and especially the Security Council. Currently, problems can be considerable in this respect. Moreover, if decisions are made based on short-term political or resource calculation more than a **fundamental aim of restoring peace**, peace operations may not be effective. Ability of the Security Council to take decisions and its **full and steadfast support to the implementation of the operations** for their **entire life cycle**, is vital – both for the success of the peace processes that peace operations are designed to promote, and for the implementation of the operations' mandates. While the **Security Council has the primary role** in the maintenance of international peace and security, it must be recognized that in the past decades, the **General Assembly has also acted**, and even mandated peace operations.

Peace operations continue to face complex challenges such as hostile non-state actors, terrorist or extremist activity, organized crime and in some circumstances proxy activity may be involved.

Peace operations are directly targeted by mis- and disinformation campaigns that undermine the work of operations and may even put its personnel in danger. **Fighting back against mis- and disinformation** is a continuous priority. It is important to build capacity throughout the UN system and proactively design ways to tackle falsehoods that trigger instability, violence, or even death. At worst, mis- and disinformation risks operations' abilities to fulfill their mandate. Integrity of UN staff is also an essential element in maintaining the legitimacy of the operations.

Structural and cultural challenges within the UN system, specifically **compartmentalization** between peacekeeping and political efforts, do not support coherent and flexible use of responses available for the UN, or adapting peace operations and other UN efforts to changing circumstances on the ground, **in a peace process centered manner**. As stated in the Pact for the Future, the UN must be able to respond to conflicts and crisis situations in a coherent and well-coordinated manner. All components of UN response should serve the same strategic objectives and support each other.

Adequate **weight and room for the military analysis and operational planning** need to be ensured to achieve the goals under any given mandate. Currently, the **lack of strategic and operational planning**

capability of UN peacekeeping operations is a widely recognized challenge. In our view, this is a symptom of **root causes that lie in existing UN Command & Control (C²) structures**, rather than in lack of competent planners or lacking integration of component plans. Thus, this challenge cannot be fully overcome by taking UN's current C² structures for granted, but rather it calls for reviewing the UN peacekeeping C² structures comprehensively, to improve preconditions for **proper strategic and operational planning**, including **contingency planning**, and to **secure the availability of operational enablers** required for the effective execution of any peacekeeping operation.

Peace operations are a **major investment by the UN and its member states**, for the benefit of the people and countries in whose territory the operations are carried out. **Host government/country consent/support** is a key factor for the success of the missions, especially in all operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The host country/-ies **must commit** not only to the **mission's mandate**, but in peacekeeping missions also to **sufficient operational conditions and capabilities** required by the modern operating environment, including the use of new technology. In Chapter VI operations, the host country must commit to **refraining from cooperation with third parties** that would **question the peace process and the implementation of the mission's mandate**. Attacks against peacekeepers must always be condemned, investigated and the perpetrators held accountable.

Peace operations are also affected by the current financial and budgetary challenges faced by the UN. The number of positions in the missions are being decreased by up to 20%, which causes further challenges to fulfill their mandates and goals. There are also too long gaps in filling P/D positions in the operations, including leadership positions.

2. How can United Nations peace operations adapt in response to current and future challenges (e.g., in terms of political and substantive work, mandates, operational and administrative requirements, capacities)?

The starting point for adapting and reforming peace operations must be to **strengthen the UN's ability and operational capacity to maintain peace and security in each situation**, and to **make peace operations more result-oriented, efficient and effective**. The principal desired outcome should always be the **restoration of peace**. Therefore, the primary approach or motivation should not be to only launch low cost, downsized or limited number of peace operations, as situations on the ground vary considerably. The UN must remain capable of carrying out operations that are needed, the spectrum must remain wide. The ability of the **UN to act** in each case should always be the **primary goal**. The number of active peace operations should be based on a **realistic level of ambition** by taking also into consideration the opportunities of burden sharing with partnering regional organizations. **Clear and achievable mandates matched by appropriate resources** are important to avoid discrepancy between expectations and outcomes in host countries.

Efforts to **reform Security Council** and its decision-making capability are to be continued and supported. On the other hand, with the Security Council unable to make decisions, it is at least in principle **possible for the General Assembly to step in, take action and even decide on a peace operation**. There are precedents for this from different decades. The General Assembly has established peace operations and continued operations established by the Security Council. It has also indirectly supported the Security Council in establishing operations, for example by demanding a peaceful solution or promoting peace agreements.

Peace operations should always be established and implemented in a **peace process centered manner**, based on its principles and in support of its strategic objectives, as well as the real needs on the ground.

Different types of action should be mandated in accordance with the needs to achieve the **desired outcome, the restoration of peace**. This is not always possible, but even then, the desired outcome should be a common goal to all UN actors in the crisis area and all activities should be peace process oriented. When preparing operations, consideration should be given not only to the desired outcome but also to how the UN can **adjust the size of the operation** (scalability and modularity), refine the mission's mandate and objectives as the peace process proceeds, and disengage from operations when the overall security situation improves, based on a prepared **transition model or exit strategy**. Security Council should focus on defining and adjusting the **strategic mission objectives**, and ensure operations have adequate independent room for operational analysis, planning and execution, including changing the course of action when needed, within the strategic framework set by Security Council. Transitions and exit strategies need to be planned early as part of the peace process, while ensuring that **host country has necessary capacities** to take over, **gains of the peace process are consolidated**, and **the risk of relapse into conflict is minimized**.

Adaptability comes from using flexibly the **whole toolbox of responses** available for UN, ensuring that **peace processes** are always **supported by proper tools**. **Different types of operations**, peacekeeping operations, political missions, mediation and peacebuilding efforts, should be seen **as complementary**, not alternatives. The **interrelationship** - following the so called “supporting-supported concept”¹ - **and emphasis of various action should change** as the situation on the ground changes, for example as the peace process progresses or the situation escalates. Thus, there should always be the **right balance between civilian, military and police** efforts and expertise as required. In difficult crises, developments are often not consistent or foreseen early enough, and therefore, the **UN’s adequate rapid response capacity** is a key issue. When the situation escalates, the UN must also be prepared to **reinforce the operation**, with a possible **withdrawal being only a last resort** while the peace process is still ongoing.

It is important to recognize **life cycle costs of UN peace operations**. The perspective of a single budget year should not be considered as the starting point for establishing a peace operation. A **strong mandate and sufficient resources and capabilities can be the most cost-effective option for the UN and its member states in the longer term**. A **more extensive and well-coordinated response at the outset can, in the best case, produce more concrete results and shorten the duration of the UN's and its member states’ investment**, even by decades. On the other hand, in some contexts, a relevant preventive function could be achieved with relatively small input. Each situation must be assessed separately. It is important to provide

¹ “Supporting-supported concept” refers to a system where one actor of an overall international effort provides support to another, enabling the supported (primary) actor to achieve objectives set. This principle is crucial for coordinating parallel efforts of various actors and, e.g. within a peacekeeping operation, ensuring effective command relationship in all changing situations. In a peacekeeping setting, “supporting component” is responsible for providing various forms of support to the “supported component”. “Supported component” is the primary beneficiary of the support provided by the supporting component/-s. The “supported component” is responsible for the overall conduct of a peacekeeping operation under certain phase of the mandate implementation in support of a peace process as defined on the strategic level of authority (e.g. military component having primary role during a high-intensity armed conflict/escalatory phase, or civilian component having primary role during a low-intensity peacebuilding phase with SSR/DDR efforts by UN). The “supporting-supported concept” ensures clear lines of authority and responsibility, preventing confusion and ensuring more efficient operations. The concept emphasizes coordination and cooperation between different actors to achieve common objectives. Within a peacekeeping operation, the “supporting-supported concept” allows for adaptation of command relationships based on the specific requirements of the ongoing phase of the mandate implementation including during transitions.

peacekeeping operations with **sufficient resources, operational capabilities and freedom of operation**, to fulfill their mandate and strategic objectives.

Since there are many similarities and a lot of overlap in the mandates of special political missions and peacekeeping operations, **Secretariat structures, and their roles and responsibilities** with regards to the peace operations, should be **reviewed and clarified comprehensively**. Any structures and practices that uphold compartmentalized and templated approaches, as well as strict structural distinctions between mission types, should be reorganized and dismantled. Duplicate structures and units with similar tasks should be merged. A comprehensive **review of Secretariat structures** conducted parallelly with before mentioned **review of UN peacekeeping C² structures** also means that the current OMA restructuring, based on today's functional logic, should be put on hold until further notice.

Reforming UN peacekeeping to respond to future demands also requires **reviewing its C² structures**. The starting point should be clarifying the leadership relationships as well as the **roles and responsibilities of military authority** ("uniformed peacekeeping") **at strategic** (political-strategic), **operational and tactical** (field operation) **levels**. The goal should be, among other things, to focus the resources to do **"right things at the right level of authority"**, to **improve operational-level planning** capacity, including contingency planning, to **develop force sourcing** among member states in support of force generation processes, and to ensure planning for and availability of **critical operational-level enablers** (including logistics support, sea and air transport capabilities, ISR support, C4I system and cyber defense capabilities, medical support and operational out-of-area reserves). The C² review should also take into account the UN management system that governs peace operations and UN field operations as a whole (civilian functions, e.g. the role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General) by clarifying **levels of authority** with **functional cooperation and coordination roles** (incl. up-to-date operational level C² functions) **based on the "supporting-supported concept"** described. The planning of operations and the assessment of their effectiveness must be systematized and developed. Planning practices at strategic and operational level, including strategic foresight, lessons learnt processes and timely impact evaluation at UNHQ level, need to be strengthened to anticipate changes on the ground and ensure proactive and timely responses.

Finland supports UN policing that leverages the policing capabilities and expertise across UN system. This requires **enhancing coordination and cooperation** between all the relevant actors at UNHQ and in the field, including by fully utilizing existing platforms such as Global Focal Point on Rule of Law and the Inter-Agency Task Force on Policing. At the mission level **coordination and cooperation with the military and civilian components as well as with other UN actors**, is key to successful missions.

To better respond to current and emerging policing challenges in the context of UN peace operations, such as transnational organized crime or sexual- and gender-based violence, UN Police should continue **improving performance**, including through further **developing specialized capacities** such as the Specialized Police Teams, and **prioritizing merit-based recruitment supported by training**. The development of training architecture for UN Police should take place in consultation and cooperation with police-contributing countries. In addition to increasing the number of Specialized Police Teams, it would be important to open more IPO positions with specific job descriptions, such as Deputy Police Advisor posts, requiring long-term police experience in order to identify best experts for the UN operations to fulfill their mandates and goals. If there is a need to leave positions vacant due to the budget cuts, it should be started from the positions which require less expertise and have less impact on the mission objectives.

3. What could United Nations peace operations be expected and mandated to do in the future? Under what conditions are United Nations peace operations least likely to be effective in achieving their objectives? Under what conditions are United Nations peace operations most likely to achieve their objectives?

UN peace operations can succeed only when there is a viable political project they support. Therefore, peace operations should be more focused and targeted, **responding to requirements of the peace process and specific challenges identified as well as needs for capacity building and reforms** in the host country. This might also increase the local buy-in by host governments. However, many peace operations have contributed to protection of civilians, and this should remain a central element also in the future, where needed. Peace operations must **continue to put people first and**, in particular, the **UN must take resolute action at the face of atrocities**. Commitment to human rights stems from the Charter.

There may be situations when **UN response under Chapter VII** of the Charter to **prevent escalation**, to **protect civilians**, to **promote disarmament** or to **pave the way for viable peace process** is necessary. If the UN takes on such operations, higher risks for such operations to be less effective must be tolerated, as operations are deployed under more difficult circumstances and with uncertainty of the course the conflict might take. Of course, risks must be anticipated as far as possible.

Protection of civilians has been included in mandates due to extremely painful lessons from the past. Commitment to **people-centered approach** is not only normative: it is a prerequisite for consolidating peace. Peace operations' responsibilities extend beyond host government. **Building resilient societies** requires promotion of political dialogue and confidence building. It is important that peace operations are, where possible, closely connected to the communities they serve. Local dynamics can often be drivers of conflict. Therefore, **inclusive approach, community engagement, civil society relations and local ownership** are crucial for any **peace process**. Although protection mandate usually lies with a peacekeeping operation that is much larger and better resourced, also SPMs can play a critical role, e.g. through mediation efforts, promoting dialogue and building confidence between communities, improving relations between government/state institutions and civil society, empowering populations to access and exercise their rights, and through monitoring and reporting and capacity building. Peace operations can also assist in ensuring that local views are taken into account on national and international levels.

UN peace operations will only be successful in building sustainable peace, if gender dynamics and women's contributions are considered. As the **Women, Peace and Security agenda** approaches its 25th anniversary marked by the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, it faces challenges. It is important to ensure **full, equal, safe and meaningful participation and leadership of women** in all political, military and security structures. This is a proven way towards improving security and stability. Peace operations are key actors in facilitating that. Peace operations must be **gender-responsive** and consider needs and perspectives of all individuals, including women, men, and gender-diverse people, in all activities. There is no aspect of peacekeeping that should be excluded from gender scrutiny.

In addition, sustainable peace and security cannot be achieved without the meaningful contribution of young people. They need to be seen as contributors towards peace and stability. As youth run a risk of being recruited into criminal and extremist activities, creating opportunities for them to contribute to their societies in a positive way, must be a key strategic goal. Stronger focus on **Youth, Peace and Security** aspects of UN peace operations is needed.

It is crucial to make sure that the UN delivers as one effectively in the field. **Coordination of efforts on parallel lines of action of various UN actors** following the “supporting-supported concept” should be the guiding principle not only for design, but also implementation of UN peace operations. Peace operations are almost always deployed in contexts where UN agencies, funds, and programs work already. Peace operations planned should take into consideration the **capacities already available within the UN system**, to avoid duplication and ensure coherence. **Primary responsibility** of UN efforts at each moment should remain **with the “supported UN actor” on ground**, whether civilian, military or police. Parallely, **cooperation and role of the Peacebuilding Commission** can be enhanced. Effective co-operation and coordination make it easier to transfer responsibilities during a transition, including through sharing good practices, mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention and peacebuilding efforts, to avoid possible relapse into conflict.

It is important to recognize the **role and the need to reform UN Police**. UN Police plays an important role in peace operations, not only in police-specific forms of assistance, but also in preventive action, support of peace agreements, protection of civilians, building trust, supporting community policing, transition assistance, addressing transnational organized crime, countering sexual and gender-based violence as well as in wider security sector and rule of law reforms.

As part of the peace process supported, **capacity building and training of local actors** are essential tools in UN peace operations. E.g. policing responses in UN peace operations should be linked to justice, prosecution and corrections responses and broader rule of law reforms. The need for specific police and/or rule of law mission should be considered in such situations. However, the **sustainability of these activities** should be given greater consideration to create lasting impact on institutions in host nations. **Systematic tools to assess the impact** of capacity building and training should be developed.

Any compromise of integrity puts the reputation of a peace operation in question and may feed to hybrid campaigns and seriously undermine the legitimacy of operations. Local population must be able to trust UN peacekeepers and staff under all circumstances. Therefore, there must be **zero tolerance to any wrongdoing**, harassment, gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse both on duty and off duty. All allegations must be thoroughly investigated without delay. In addition, UN should consider **proper sanctioning mechanism on T-/PCCs** with their uniformed personnel found guilty of misconduct.

4. What could be the role of partnerships, with regional organizations, international financial institutions, or other actors, in future United Nations peace operations? What are the opportunities and challenges presented by partnerships, and what principles should underpin them?

In addition to taking into consideration the UN capacities already available in the country, peace operations should be planned to **work effectively with partners** outside of the UN system. Coordination to **avoid duplication** as well as **alignment of activities** in support of a common political goals is crucial. Shared strategies and cooperation already in planning of action should be the goal.

In this context it is also worth highlighting that **Security Council resolution 2719** is not only a demonstration of partnership, but also an exercise on how the UN could draw upon external capacities. In addition to independent peace operations by regional organization mandated and partially funded by UN, it should also be considered as an option that, under a partnership framework with the UN, a **regional organization could provide certain component(-s)** to act under the UN peace operation.

As highlighted above, reforming UN peacekeeping also requires reviewing its Command and Control (C²) structures. With respect to this, it is worth noting that a regional organization could also **partner with UN by contributing its standing command structure at operational level** for support of an UN peacekeeping operation. E.g. in case of European Union, this has already been considered under the ongoing review and update of the EU-UN strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management, and their new framework for joint priorities which is highly positive.

Questions for Member States that are hosting United Nations peace operations or have hosted them in the past

6. From your national perspective, having hosted one or more United Nations peace operations, what are the most critical considerations and conditions for success?
7. Based on your country's experience, what lessons learned should inform future United Nations peace operations?
8. What positive and/or negative examples can you share in terms of how current or past United Nations peace operations have implemented their mandates in, or related to, your country/context?

Questions for current and former Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries

9. What factors shaped your country's decision to become a T/PCC to United Nations peace operations? What factors and considerations will determine whether your country will remain an active T/PCCs in future United Nations peace operations?

Finland has contributed to UN peacekeeping operations since 1956 and continues to do so. Participation in peace operations is a long-standing element of our foreign, security and defence policy. Contribution to UN peace operations is a concrete way of supporting conflict resolution, prevention, and more broadly the UN, its Charter, multilateralism and international law. It also offers our defence and police forces relevant professional experience, which they are, in turn, able to share for the benefit of the UN's objectives and principles, but at the same time improving our homeland defence capability and internal security.

Finland's approach emphasises comprehensive crisis management and the necessity and impact of activities. By participating in international crisis management operations and missions, Finland is promoting social stability, peace, human rights, the rule of law and equality in conflict areas.

For it is imperative that UN peacekeeping remains relevant and continues to uphold the core principles of international law. This requires continuous development, and the current global challenges requires the UN peacekeeping also to evolve.

Moreover, Finland is also a strongly committed police-contributing country and supporter of UN peace operations with a pledge of 20 police experts/IPOs since 2015 and a leading nation in the Specialized Police Team in UNMISS since 2018. Based on the Governmental program, our aim is to support in stabilizing conflict regions and in countering irregular migration via participating in international operations. Finland's aim is to put forward experienced and competent experts to support UN peace operations in fulfilling their mandates

and goals. Finnish experts gather important professional and international experience, contacts and lessons learned, which benefits their deploying institutions at home when they repatriate.

10. How would you assess the degree to which your views as a T/PCC were, or are, taken into consideration with regard to the mandates of United Nations peace operations and their implementation?

When reforming and developing peacekeeping practices, the UN Secretariat often tends only to **consult the largest T-/PCC's measured by absolute numbers** of contributions. This means that the smaller member states will seldom, if at all, be heard, even though their **troop or police contribution in proportion to their population or gross domestic product** would be high. In the long term, consulting with different contributing countries could enable **different perspectives and innovative and future-oriented approaches** to be considered and avoid promoting the continuation of existing practices.

On the other hand, often the **only way for a smaller T-/PCC is "to buy in" a leeway for their voice** by providing XB funding for projects related to reforming and developing peacekeeping practices.

It is highly recommended that also the smaller T/PCCs would be consulted as a part of their decision-making process related to the mandates, mandate extensions and strategic reviews, as this would increase the buy-in of the decision-makers at home when renewing the pledges.

11. From your perspective as a T/PCC, what are the most pressing challenges confronting the United Nations peace operations that you are involved in?

Following challenges are widely recognized and regularly discussed with the UN Secretariat and among Member States. Several of these challenges have already been addressed above. Over the years, many challenges listed have also been addressed and sought to be resolved in UN peacekeeping related policy documents, research papers and other documentation. In our view, the list of challenges include:

- No adequate vision and strategy discussed and shared on how to develop future peace operations. This is an important discussion to be shared with Members States at the UN, and preferably not only in research institution contexts.
- Complex and volatile operating environments, multiple and variable threat spectrum including extremist and criminal threats, proxy activity, hybrid and cyber threats, etc., and even environments suffering more often from consequences of climate change.
- Ambitious and complex mandates. Objectives which do not correspond the resources, capabilities and expertise.
- Budgetary shortfalls.
- Bureaucratic processes and practices (e.g. COE reimbursement frameworks, UN – Member State bilateral MoU's, unwieldy logistic support processes for operations).
- Geographical imbalance of troop/police contributing countries (T-/PCCs) can also be seen as a challenge.
- Integrity of troop/police contributions e.g. by repeated cases of misconduct.

- Unclear mix of political/civilian and military/police levels of authority combined with ambiguous political/civilian and military/police C² structures. Lacking up-to-date operational level, out of area military/police C² structure (Operational HQ, OHQ). Lacking levels and roles of political/civilian and military/police cooperation and coordination. Critical shortfalls of military/police operational (incl. contingency) planning.
- Growing qualitative capability and equipment requirements to be fulfilled. Force sourcing and generation challenges with shortfalls of modern high-tech capabilities. Critical shortfalls of crucial enabling capabilities (e.g. LOG, C⁴ISR, ENG, FP etc.).
- Compromised military/police freedom of operation (e.g. logistical constraints, shortfalls of fixed/rotary wing/unmanned aviation, other capability constraints).
- Lacking rapid deployment capabilities including non-existing operational out-of-area reserves.
- Pending implementation of recommendations from the external audits to improve the recruitment processes, including the transparency and feedback system for the T/PCCs. For example, the recruitment processes are extremely long and lacking transparency.
- Risk that the training process for the police candidates applying for the UN operations may become too overloading and excessive financial burden for the small PCCs.

Agility or adaptability (sometimes “nimbleness”) should not automatically be understood as smallness, compactness, lightweight and inexpensiveness. In military planning logic, the case is often quite the contrary: for **more agility and adaptability**, following is often required; up-to-date C² structures with adequate capacities, manpower large enough, capabilities (incl. kinetic) forceful enough (also for deterrence and force protection), self-sufficient logistic and C⁴ISR capacities, organic air and ground lift capabilities (sealift in some cases), capabilities for force projection (incl. e.g. C-UAS), rapidly deployable tactical and operational (incl. out-of-area) reserves etc.

Thus, what a political decision-maker often understands as agile, adaptable and nimble does not necessarily represent the same qualities for the military executing the mandated operations. If/when political decision-makers resort to military means (e.g. UN peacekeeping operation), **sufficient resources and capabilities** ought **to be ensured** and **put under the lead of able and independent commanders** responsible for mandate execution **supported by up-to-date C² structures. In the longer run, a credible and forceful peacekeeping operation, with an executable mandate and clear exit strategy, may prove to be more cost-efficient** than a peacekeeping operation deployed for decades with complex mandate combined with lacking manpower and military capabilities.

Today’s operational environments of UN peacekeeping with their evolving threat landscape require **modern and robust C² structures**. This means also **clarity of the leadership** relationships as well as the **roles and responsibilities of military authority** (“uniformed peacekeeping”) at **strategic, operational and tactical levels**. The goal should be, among other things, to **improve strategic and operational-level planning**, including contingency planning, and to **secure operational-level enablers** in all security situation and scenarios. UN peacekeeping operations, often encompassing tens of thousands of uniformed military and police personnel with heavy equipment and other capabilities dependent on accessible and reliable logistic support, operating in a multi-domain threat environment, must be **planned, managed and commanded in a professional manner with up-to-date command and planning structures and practices** in order to

secure the **accountability of the UN efforts** in light of fundamental goal setting of restoration of peace, host nation's expectations as well as member states investments in form of funding, personnel and capabilities. Therefore, in addition to processes, staffing, integration, training and other aspects often discussed, also reviewing C² structures should be included in any review process making way for future peacekeeping.

Any comprehensive planning process also requires **functional structures with best possible expertise and capabilities** to execute the planning as well as to implement the plan(s) under the strategic objectives of mandate implementation. Thus, the UN peacekeeping operations, including their command, management, planning and execution, should always follow the principle of “**the best professionals to concentrate in functions they are the best at**”. While ensuring the primacy of political mandating and strategic level direction and guidance, this means, that rather than being subordinated to each other, the **components** of any peacekeeping operation should be seen as **parallel lines of operation** implementing the given mandate in accordance with the **shared strategic level direction and guidance provided only at the UNHQ level**, and, acting in **coordination at operational and tactical levels** by following “**supporting-supported concept**” as required by the peace process promoted, the alignment of planning and assessment efforts along these lines of operation, and the overall security situation in the area of operations.

Stronger, better integrated and adaptable peace operations also place growing **qualitative capability and equipment requirements** to be fulfilled by T-/PCCs. One factor impacting the efficiency of the UN peacekeeping are the **existing COE practices that have** become a business model for some T-/PCCs, thus **favoring contributions of capabilities of lower performance**, as well as promotion of permanence rather than forward looking orientation. Some well-planned periodic rotation among T-/PCCs could be helpful in this sense. On the other hand, the UN COE practices should better encourage, facilitate and reward member states' **high-tech and rapidly deployable capability contributions** to UN missions (e.g. C4ISR4, aviation, kinetic effects capabilities, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (CUAS) systems, counter-IED and EOD and medical capabilities).

To promote more flexible troop/police contribution options, the UN should actively **investigate alternative ways** for member states to contribute troops, capabilities and enabling/supporting functions and services for peace operations while ensuring that UN principles are upheld. New, **innovative, nonconventional ways for member states, or regional organizations as partners for UN, to contribute**, e.g. **on their own cost** and/or **in multinational frameworks** including **out of area of operations contributions**, could be developed alongside existing practices.

To ease existing budgetary shortfalls of UN peacekeeping operations, it could be considered that T-/PCCs and regional organizations should be **allowed (if pledging to do so) to cover own costs with no UN reimbursements**. Despite this, UN Statements of Unit Requirements (SUR) are always to be fulfilled by T-/PCCs. In practice, this would only represent extension of the application of current UN practices, thus **providing increased flexibility** with regards to the budgeting of UN peacekeeping operations and troop/police contributions. Troop/police contributions with own funding are already an existing practice, since UN reimbursements only cover the costs of troops and their equipment in accordance with the MoU between T-/PCC and UNHQ. Other elements deployed by T-/PCC as part of its overall contribution, for example National Support Elements (NSEs), fall fully under own financing of the contributing member state. The similar is the case with UNMOs and staff officers or IPOs contributed.

The Special Committee for Peacekeeping (C-34) has noted in its 2024 report that the **lack of critical enabling assets** negatively impacts the implementation of UN peacekeeping-mandated tasks. In this regard, C-34 has

encouraged to enhance mission capabilities as informed by military capability assessments. According to the Special Committee, **rotational mechanisms**, which would allow T-/PCCs to combine their capabilities to facilitate the availability of critical enabling assets in peacekeeping operations **through a multinational arrangement** with the UN, could be a way forward to address the lack of these assets in UN peacekeeping operations. Keeping the recommendations above in mind, **multinational co-deployment arrangements** should be developed in order to encourage T-/PCC's, especially smaller Member States with limited resources, to provide units/capabilities required – increasing flexibility of contribution while decreasing bureaucracy at UNHQ level. Of course, general UN rules and regulations (policies, SOPs, manuals) are to be followed as well as UN Statements of Unit Requirements fulfilled.

Following are some examples of possible multinational co-deployment contribution options:

- Mechanized Infantry Battalion for UN peacekeeping operation.
- Strategic air/sea lift capabilities.
- ISR unit for UN peacekeeping operation.

Under the C-34 negotiation process the EU group has made, so far unsuccessfully, suggestions to request the UN Secretariat to explore more possibilities for the member states to provide **capabilities or services to the UN peace operations without physical deployment in the mission area**. This could be accomplished by either supporting the operation remotely, or by providing short-term support from bases outside the area of operations. This would **decrease the footprint of the operation** in the host nation(s), **increase the safety and security** of the troops (military/police) contributed and **make more and high-quality services available** to the missions in a flexible manner and at lower costs. In this case too, general UN rules and regulations (policies, SOPs, manuals) are to be followed as well as UN Statements of Unit Requirements fulfilled. In addition, the Status of Forces Agreement(s) (SOFA) with host country(-ies) should recognize the existence of such out of area elements of an UN Peace Operation.

Following are some examples of possible out of area of operations contributions:

- Peacekeeping intelligence support for UN peace operation.
- Cyber defence support for UN peace operation.
- Medical support (Level 2 and above) for UN peace operation.
- Strategic air-/sealift support for UN peace operation.

Following are some examples of possible contribution options combining multinational co-deployment arrangements and out of area of operations contributions:

- Operational Headquarters (out of area OHQ) for UN peacekeeping operation (-s).
- Rapidly deployable operational (out of area) reserve for UN peacekeeping operation (-s).

Finland supports efforts to improve performance and accountability of peacekeeping operations and the safety and security of peacekeepers. Making peacekeeping operations **smarter with integrating digital technologies** into analysis, planning, implementation, and evaluation is essential in this.

Finally, **training** is an essential investment throughout the operation cycle and enables UN to implement increasingly diverse mandates effectively and with integrity. While aiming at more adaptable peace operations, troop, police as well as individual expert contributions need to be **measured not just by quantity, but to a growing extent by quality**. This requires defining job descriptions according to specialized tasks,

recruiting based on merits for these tasks, and complementing this with pre-deployment and in-mission training. Increasing the number of posts requiring higher professional competences and consistently reducing the number of posts with lower competence level, could also bring budget savings to the UN. Deploying Specialized Police Teams is a good example of increasing quality and impact of expertise in peace operations as in these posts the police experts/IPOs are guaranteed to be able to work with tasks matching with their competences and expertise. UN training standards must be fit-for-purpose, and **every contributing country, throughout every personnel rotation, must meet the UN training standards** of all uniformed and civilian personnel deployed in UN missions. The development of training standards should be agreed in consultation and close cooperation with T/PCCs. In addition, training requirements should be realistic and not cause an excessive burden to the smaller T/PCCs.

12. Based on your experience deploying peacekeepers, what capabilities and support would be needed for deployments in the future?

Developing the leadership relations and military command structures (C²) as described above is a prerequisite for the UN to be able to respond to future challenges of peacekeeping. The goal should be, among other things, to **improve operational-level planning**, including contingency planning, and to **secure operational-level enablers** (including logistics, sea and air transport capabilities, ISR, C4I system and cyber defense capabilities, medical and out-of-area operational reserves) in all situations.

Furthermore, UN COE practices should better encourage, facilitate and reward member states' **high-tech and rapidly deployable capability contributions** to UN missions (e.g. C4ISR4, aviation, kinetic effects capabilities, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (CUAS) systems, C-RAM capabilities, counter-IED and EOD and medical capabilities).

As conflicts often are complex and may involve for instance extremist activity, organized crime and proxy elements, the capabilities should be planned accordingly, including peacekeeping intelligence capabilities.

Recruitment processes in UN peacekeeping operations and their quality, including merit-based recruitment, speed, transparency and feedback, should be developed in accordance with the recommendations of external evaluations and well as **in close consultation with T-/PCCs**. Highly professional recruitment system would also assist in attracting qualified, experienced and competent candidates and in giving a positive image about the UN.